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Abstract
Communal land tenure is prevalent across many developing countries. It implements a
“use it or lose it” principle that allows owners to farm their land but restricts their right
to transfer it away. This paper measures the distortionary impact of communal land in
a dynamic general equilibrium model of occupational selection, calibrated to Ethiopia.
We find that lifting communal land tenure increases GDP by 9% and lowers agricultural
employment by 18 percentage points. While agricultural productivity increases, that
of non-agriculture drops. Communal land tenure helps rationalizing about one-half
of the relative agricultural productivity gap in the poorest economies. Its impact on
aggregate productivity, though, is comparatively minor.
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1. Introduction
The labor productivity gap between rich and poor countries is larger in the agri-
cultural sector than in the rest of the economy (Caselli, 2005; Restuccia et al., 2008).
Are there particular policies or institutions in developing countries that depress rel-
ative agricultural productivity? If yes, do they also entail large losses in aggregate
productivity? The aim of this paper is to evaluate one such institution, the communal
land tenure system. It is prevalent across the developing world and most notably in
Sub-Saharan Africa, the focus of our analysis. As we will elaborate further below, the
term “communal” is a catch-all for many characteristics. A defining one is that land
property rights are not complete because the allocative control is vested in either the
community or the state. More precisely, land user rights are subject to limited trans-
ferability. Individuals cannot freely sell and/or rent out their land. If they do, they
risk expropriation, following a “use it or lose it” principle.
We analyze this particular land tenure system in a general equilibrium selection
model where individuals make an occupational choice between agriculture and non-
agriculture. In agriculture, they run their own farm and choose the scale of their land
operations. Individuals hold user rights over communal land that are renewed every
period unless expropriation occurs. The sale of communal land is prohibited, while
rentals are allowed, but risky. Specifically, the risk of expropriation rises in the fraction
of the land that is rented out: individuals who do not rent out their land face no
expropriation risk while individuals who rent out all of their land (i.e., those who work
in non-agriculture) face the highest risk. Finally, expropriated land is reallocated to
farmers only and follows a probabilistic rule that favors those who are land-poor.
Our main contribution is to measure the impact on the aggregate economy of a
reform that removes communal land tenure. The model is calibrated to Ethiopia,
an ideal benchmark economy because typical features of communal land tenure are
codified in law.3 The key result is then the comparison of the calibrated economy to
3This formalization allows for a clean mapping from the data to the model. In particular, we exploit
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a counterfactual one where communal land is no longer subject to expropriation and
reallocation.
Such a reform generates an aggregate productivity (GDP) increase of 9%. This is
driven mostly by a rise in non-agricultural output of 16% while agricultural output
remains almost flat, up by 3%. Communal land tenure therefore has a non-negligible
negative impact on GDP, but that effect is an order of magnitude away from explaining
the wealth of nations. The reform also induces a sizable decrease in agricultural employ-
ment of 18 percentage points, or 25%. While real agricultural labor productivity rises
substantially, by 37%, the reform also generates a large fall in real non-agricultural la-
bor productivity of 29%. It follows that the ratio of real productivity in non-agriculture
relative to agriculture drops by 49%. To put this number in context, that productivity
ratio – henceforth referred to as the real agricultural productivity gap (real AGP) –
is roughly 7.9 times higher in the poorest relative to the richest decile of countries.4
We find that communal land tenure helps explaining this enormous factor difference.
Thinking of Ethiopia as a representative economy of the poorest decile of countries,
the elimination of land transfer restrictions halves the real APG vis-à-vis the richest
countries to 7.9 × (1− 0.49) = 4.
The reform removes two types of misallocation. The first one is that of occupational
choice. Under communal tenure, many individuals with a comparative advantage in
non-agriculture decide to work as farmers in order to mitigate the risk of losing their
accumulated communal land and, to a lesser extent, because they expect to receive
additional land grants in the future. Our key message is that these occupationally
constrained farmers are typically endowed with low skills in both agricultural and non-
agricultural activities. The intuition is as follows. Comparative advantage in non-
agriculture is a relative concept that is traded off against the expected discounted flow
the fact that all land in Ethiopia has limits on transferability, that any land sales are prohibited, and
that land ownership is tied to continuous nearby residence.
4That number is based on our estimates using data around 2005. See Appendix A for details. Caselli
(2005) and Restuccia et al. (2008) estimate it to be roughly a factor of 10 around the year 1985. In
any case, the real APG in poor countries is large, which is also confirmed by Gollin et al. (2014a) who
focus on the most important staple crops.
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value of holding communal land. High-skilled individuals will cherish the comparative
skill advantage more and locate in non-agriculture. Low-skilled individuals, on the
other hand, may find that their comparative advantage does not outweigh the asset
value of the communal land holdings.
Securing complete property right will thus lead to large shift of disproportionately
unskilled workers from agriculture into non-agriculture. The change in the skill compo-
sition generates a drop in non-agricultural productivity. Conversely, the occupational
shift also accounts for roughly 80% of the increase in agricultural productivity. This
works through two channels. The main one is the composition effect as the average
skill of the remaining farmers rises. The other channel is the mechanical negative rela-
tionship between the total number of farmers and agricultural labor productivity due
to the fixed supply of land.
The other type of misallocation pertains to the scale of operation across farmers.
Under communal tenure, distortions arise because relatively land-rich farmers restrict
the amount of land that they rent out to shield themselves from the risk of expro-
priation. As a result, relatively high-skilled and land-poor farmers face high rental
rates and thus operate relatively little land. Removing this misallocation accounts for
roughly one-fifth of the agricultural productivity increase.
Since occupational misallocation is the key driving force, the aggregate productivity
gain from fully securing communal land rights is muted. The productivity gains in one
sector are, to a large extent, offset by productivity losses in non-agriculture.
Section 2 positions our contribution within the literature. Section 3 describes the
institutional characteristics of communal land. Section 4 lays out the model. Section
5 characterizes the equilibrium. In Section 6 we discuss the calibration of the model.
Section 7 presents the main findings and counterfactuals. Section 8 concludes.
2. Literature
This paper connects with several strands of the literature. The first is the classic
dual-economy literature that stipulates occupational barriers that keep inefficiently
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many workers in the agricultural sector and prevent the equalization of the two sectors’
marginal products (Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970). Communal land tenure acts
precisely as such a barrier: holding everything else constant, individuals prefer working
in agriculture to secure and accumulate communal land. The upshot is that the relative
nominal value-added per worker in agriculture is depressed.5 We find that a land
reform that allows communal land to be transferred freely would lead to a decrease in
the nominal productivity in non-agriculture relative to agriculture of 53%. Communal
land thus rationalizes much of the nominal APG (i.e., the real APG adjusted for the
relative sectoral price), which is roughly 3.5 times higher in the poorest compared to
the richest decile of countries.6
Second, we connect with a recent literature that finds that in developing countries,
the relative skill and work intensity of agricultural workers is low. This implies that
relatively low agricultural wages (and by extension also relatively low real and nom-
inal agricultural productivity) simply reflect selection. Gollin et al. (2014b) find that
adjustments to observable hours worked and human capital reduce the cross-country
APG factor difference by up to a half.7 Lagakos and Waugh (2013) rationalize such
a pattern as an efficient outcome. In their sorting model the skill distribution implies
that high agricultural employment is accompanied by a fall in the average skill of agri-
cultural workers relative to that of non-agricultural workers.8 This mechanism is also
present in our framework, though part of the selection is inefficient. Communal land
tenure acts an occupational barrier for all workers, but in particular the unskilled ones.
This paper follows in the footsteps of a growing macro development literature that
5See Vollrath (2009) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011) regarding possible GDP gains from equalizing
sectoral value-added.
6See Appendix A for the computation of this factor.
7Also, longitudinal data on Brazil (Alvarez, 2018) as well as Indonesia and Kenya (Hicks et al.,
2017) reveal that workers switching from non-agriculture to non-agriculture typically experience small
wage gains, which is not consistent with large occupational barriers.
8Similarly, Young (2013) finds that much of the urban-rural gap in real consumption across
countries can be explained by differences in unobserved sector-specific skills. According to
Herrendorf and Schoellman (2018) the wage gap in agriculture relative to non-agriculture in several
developing countries (excluding Sub-Saharan Africa) is in fact explained away by observable years of
education once cross-sectoral differences in returns to human capital are taken into account.
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explains the APG in developing countries as a consequence of distortions to land allo-
cation.9 Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) are among the first to study misallocation
in agriculture through the lens of a model where farmer-operators are heterogeneous in
skills. They find that matching typical features of the farm size distribution in devel-
oping countries - a low mean and low dispersion in farm size - via generic wedges can
account for an important fraction of the real APG. Restuccia and Santaeulàlia-Llopis
(2017), Adamopoulos et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2017) go a step further by us-
ing micro data to back out farm-specific TFP as well as wedges in Malawi, China
and Ethiopia, respectively. In all cases, the authors compute huge gains in aggregate
agricultural productivity from removing wedges in order to shift land from skilled to
unskilled farmers.10 In addition, Adamopoulos et al. (2017) also find that misalloca-
tion of land within agriculture generates misallocation of workers across sectors. Note
that in all three countries some of the underlying distortions are likely to be caused by
restrictions that limit transferability of land across users. Chen et al. (2017) also show
that the misallocation of land is lower in Ethiopian regions with more rental activity.
Relative to the above contributions, our paper provides a micro foundation based on
an explicit policy that explains such distortions. The most related paper is Chen (2017)
who uses a similar modeling framework to investigate the impact of non-transferable
land on the misallocation of land across farmers, and workers across sectors. His
quantification on Malawian data yields similar qualitative predictions to ours on most
variables of interest, though quantitatively we find that communal land has a some-
what weaker impact on agricultural employment and GDP. Our paper differs in two
aspects. The first is that we set up a dynamic environment in which individuals make
forward-looking decisions. The stationary distribution that maps communal holdings
to individual skills hence arises endogenously. The second aspect in which this pa-
9The APG has also been addressed by distortions encouraging home work in the rural sector
(Gollin et al., 2004), distortions to intermediate input use in agriculture (Restuccia et al., 2008), trans-
portation costs (Gollin and Rogerson, 2014), incomplete financial markets (Donovan, 2016).
10Gollin and Udry (2017) also find gains from reallocation of land across farmers in Ghana and
Uganda but caution that these gains are substantially smaller after correcting for potential measurement
error.
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per differs relative to the baseline results presented in Chen (2017) is that farmers in
our setup can rent out their communal land, albeit at the risk of expropriation. This
implies that there is relatively less operational misallocation.11
Another contribution that focuses on a specific policy is Adamopoulos and Restuccia
(2015). They provide a detailed case study of misallocation due to a sudden land re-
form and farm size caps in the Philippines. They precisely quantify a one-off event,
but their underlying institutional arrangement is very distinct. We study a process
of continuous land reallocation where agents take actions to fend off the threat of ex-
propriation. Also, the policy analyzed in Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2015) directly
constrains high-skilled farmers, while in our setting high-skilled farmers are affected by
the policy only through the high equilibrium rental rate of land. Our results are hence
very complementary to theirs.
We also touch base with the microeconomic literature on tenure insecurity and agri-
cultural productivity. A limited number of these papers focus on misallocation across
users. The contributions in Holden et al. (2009), for example, provide evidence that
land security boosts allocative gains in several Sub-Saharan African countries. In the
Ethiopian context de Brauw and Mueller (2012) find that perceptions of land tenure
security foster increased rural-urban migration. A study on the Dominican Republic
by Macours et al. (2010) finds that insecure land rights prompt owners to limit land
rentals to close kin only, thus preventing allocation to more efficient users. In the case
of Mexico, de Janvry et al. (2015) document that formal land titling enabled a market-
based reallocation (through sales and rentals) to more productive land-poor from less
productive land-rich farmers, and a stronger outmigration of the latter. These papers
measure misallocation in a partial equilibrium setting while our paper stresses equilib-
rium adjustments, which turn out to be crucial. Specifically, we find that communal
land tenure substantially increases the rental rate of land. This is because it induces a
larger number of farmers and because these farmer run excessive land operations, thus
11We allow for land rental market activity, in accordance with recent evidence from Sub-Saharan
Africa (Holden et al., 2009).
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stifling the rental market.
One aspect that we abstract from are productive investment incentives in the face
of tenure insecurity. This is beyond the scope of the present paper, but we do note
that our framework is well-suited for such an extension. Suffice it to say that the
empirical literature on the effect of increasing tenure security on investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa has been very active, identifying several pathways. First, investment
can increase as the likelihood of recouping its returns is higher, as shown by Besley
(1995) and Goldstein and Udry (2008) in studies on Ghana, by Ali et al. (2011) in
Ethiopia, and by Fenske (2011) in several countries in West Africa. Second, land
investment may also decrease as individuals with weak titles feel more compelled to
secure their user rights via intensive outlays - see for instance Place and Otsuka (2002)
and Deininger and Jin (2006). Third, securing land rights may raise collateral to be
used for credit and investment (Feder, 1985), though there is little evidence of such a
channel in Africa (Brasselle et al., 2002).
3. Institutional environment
3.1. Communal land across countries
Communal land tenure systems are present in many developing countries, in par-
ticular in Sub-Saharan Africa. There, land tenure is often prescribed by customary
law that varies across as well as within countries (Pande and Udry, 2005). Its features,
however, can be summed up by the principle of “use it or lose it” whereby rights to
land can be claimed only through the use of land, and only for the duration of that use
(Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997).12 This principle restricts the commercialisation of land,
whether that be through sales or rentals. Land sales require the consent of extended
family members, clan leaders, or chiefs; they may block them on the notion that one
cannot sell something that one had been granted by the community (Atwood, 1990;
12Some communal land tenure systems also feature collective ownership, for example with regards to
pastures. The resulting classical incentive problems are not addressed here as our framework focuses
on exclusive user rights.
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Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994). Also, farmers are reluctant to rent out their land to
tenants who, by virtue of working it, can stake a claim to ownership.13 Such a threat
is particularly likely for landlords who migrate; owners in effect invest “guard labor”
to prevent expropriation (Field, 2007). If expropriated, the user rights to the land are
tacitly or explicitly reallocated by local authorities. One particular concern in the re-
allocation process is to prevent the emergence of a large landless class of farmers. This
is reflected in the comparatively low inequality in land ownership in most Sub-Saharan
African countries (Place, 2009). In some countries, all land belongs to the state and
the principles of customary land tenure apply formally (e.g. in Ethiopia and Tanzania).
Beyond Sub-Saharan Africa, formal or informal rules can be found across other parts
of the world, prominent examples being the ejidos in Mexico (de Janvry et al., 2015)
or public land in China (Jacoby et al., 2002; Deininger and Jin, 2009) and Vietnam
(Do and Iyer, 2008).
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Figure 1: Relative agricultural productivity and land tenure insecurity.
Measuring the extent of limited land transferability is not straightforward. As
it is enforced via expropriation, one proxy is tenure insecurity. Figure 1 shows the
cross-country relationship between a tenure insecurity index and productivity in non-
13Bomuhangi et al. (2011) show that land rentals are especially risky for disadvantaged owners such
as women.
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agriculture relative to agriculture (both real and nominal).14 The statistically signifi-
cant correlation suggests that countries with higher tenure insecurity feature a larger
APG, both in real and nominal terms, which serves as a motivation for our analysis.15
3.2. Land tenure in Ethiopia
Our quantification is based on Ethiopia, an ideal benchmark economy for our pur-
poses. It is a large country that is representative of the poorer economies of Sub-
Saharan Africa.16 With respect to measurement, customary law poses the difficulty
of being informal as well as diverse across areas and ethnicities within the same coun-
try. Ethiopia’s communal land tenure regime, by contrast, is codified in law. While
some details of the legal architecture vary across federal regions, its main features are
identical. These properties facilitate the mapping from the model to the data.
Up until 1975 Ethiopia’s land tenure system had feudal characteristics. The ma-
jority of land was granted by the emperor to absentee landlords and worked by tenant
sharecroppers (Rahmato, 1984). Following the socialist revolution, farms were na-
tionalized and collectivized. After the departure of the Derg regime in 1991, farms
were de-collectivized and households were granted permanent use rights. Renting
land and hiring of labor were legalized again, and major land redistributions stopped,
except in Amhara where one last large scale land redistribution occurred in 1997
(Benin and Pender, 2009). The fundamental principles governing land tenure have
remained intact since 1991, codified in the 1997 Constitution.
The existing legal framework has three de jure prescriptions regarding land transfer-
14The land tenure insecurity index is computed by CEPII and is a composite measure of several
factors. See Appendix A for details on the index and the regression.
15The tenure insecurity index, besides accounting for land expropriation, also accounts for formal land
titling. In Sub-Saharan Africa only about 10 percent of agricultural land is registered (Byamugisha,
2013). The absence of official titles, however, does not necessarily imply low transferability, nor does
their presence guarantee free transactions. This is well documented for tenure regimes in Côte d’Ivoire
and Ghana by Pande and Udry (2005).
16According to World Bank data for 2012, Ethiopia’s GDP per capita in PPP is 1,256 USD, its
agricultural employment share is 73%, and it disposes of 0.16 hectares of arable land per capita. The
corresponding figures for the average of Sub-Saharan Africa are 3,241 USD, 57%, and 0.22 hectares
per capita. Also, relative to U.S., Ethiopia’s real and nominal APG is 14.3 and 3.7, respectively. The
unweighted country average for Sub-Saharan Africa is 8.3 and 2.6, respectively.
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ability that guide our modeling choice. First, according to the Constitution of Ethiopia
“Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and
shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange.” This declares all attempts
of land sales and mortgages as illegal, and circumscribes land rental activities. Sec-
ond, the Regional Land Proclamations (2007) set limits on the duration and amount of
land that can be rented out. Under “traditional technology” these vary between three
years everywhere except for Amhara where it is twenty-five years, and between 50% of
land holdings in Oromia and Tigray to 100% in Amhara and in Southern Nations, Na-
tionalities, and Peoples’ Region. Third, the Federal Land Proclamation (2005) defines
an additional restriction on land transferability: land can be leased, but only without
causing displacement, i.e. migration (Deininger et al., 2008).
The legal framework of land expropriation coincides with the de facto perceptions of
the law by households. The Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS), a panel dataset
of six rounds collected between 1994 and 2004, contains questions on the perception of
different dimensions of land rights. Based on that dataset, Deininger and Jin (2006)
and Dercon and Krishnan (2010) show that expropriation threatens those that do not
make continuous and productive use of their land. In particular, Dercon and Krishnan
(2010) show that the perceived tenure security is weaker on rented as opposed to
non-rented plots. This evidence strengthens the argument that communal land expro-
priation is more likely to occur on land that is not operated by its owner. Moreover,
Deininger et al. (2003) estimate that the household’s expectation of losing land, con-
trolling for regional variation, increases by 10 percent if the household head has an
off-farm employment. This shows that continued enjoyment of land user rights is con-
tingent on physical residence in the village (Rahmato, 2003).
The Ethiopian legal framework further prescribes how land user rights are acquired.
The Constitution of Ethiopia states that “Ethiopian peasants have right to obtain land
without payment.” Also, one of the guiding principles of the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper issued by the Federal Government is to grant access to land to every individual
who wants to make a livelihood from farming (Rahmato, 2004). In contrast to this
11
de jure evidence, there is relatively little research on de facto outcomes. Based on the
ERHS dataset, Deininger et al. (2003) provide evidence that land reallocations among
farmers have been driven mainly by political concerns rather than economic ones.17
4. A model of communal land
4.1. Individuals and stand-in household
The economy is populated by a unit measure of infinitely lived individuals. In
each time period, the individual’s state consists of three elements: (i) his productive
skill in the agricultural sector, za > 0; (ii) his productive skill in the non-agricultural
sector, zn > 0; and (iii) his endowment of communal land, lc ≥ 0. Individual skills
are exogenous and drawn from a joint cumulative distribution, {za, zn} ∼ Ψ(za, zn).
With probability ζ ∈ [0, 1] the individual’s skills are redrawn jointly in the following
period, and otherwise remain unchanged.18 Communal land holdings lc, on the other
hand, evolve endogenously. To simplify the exposition, let x ≡ {za, zn, lc} denote the
individual’s state, defined over the Cartesian product of the three sets Za ×Zn ×Lc =
{(za, zn, lc)|za ∈ Za, zn ∈ Zn, lc ∈ Lc}. Let H(x) denote the associated (endogenous)
cumulative distribution function.
Individuals maximize expected value E
∑∞
t=0 β
tb(xt) where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time dis-
count factor and period utility is linear in revenue b. In each time period an individual
of type x is endowed with a unit of labor and chooses his current occupation: agriculture
(1a = 1) or non-agriculture (1a = 0). The production of non-agricultural goods is linear
in efficiency labor so that the non-agricultural wage simply equals wn(zn) = (1− θ)zn.
The parameter θ < 1 represents a wedge or tax on non-agricultural labor income; its
only role here is to improve the empirical fit of the model. In agriculture, by contrast,
each individual runs an own farm. The farm’s output, ya, depends on the individ-
17Additional evidence by Ege (1997) further emphasizes the political dimensions associated with land
reallocation in Ethiopia.
18The variation of skills through time is not an essential feature of the model. We use it for two
reasons. First, it adds an additional realistic notion at no cost to tractability. Second, as will become
clear further on, it rules out degenerate stationary equilibria with zero expropriation and reallocation.
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ual’s agricultural skill, za, as well as the choice of the scale of land operations, l ≥ 0,
according to the following production technology:
ya(za, l) = z
1−γ
a l
γ .
The production technology is kept deliberately simple to single out the interplay be-
tween fixed farmer skills and land operations.19 The rental rate of land r and the price
of agricultural output is p. The farmer’s implied labor income (or equivalently profits)
equals wa(za, l) = pya(za, l)− rl.
The individual’s period revenue is
b(x) =



wn(zn) + rlc = (1− θ)zn + rlc if 1a = 0,
wa(za, l) + rlc = pz
1−γ
a lγ + r (lc − l) otherwise.
Beyond labor income individuals earn rental income from communal land holdings lc.
Observe that non-agricultural workers (1a = 0) rent out all of their communal holdings
while agricultural workers (1a = 1) either receive rental payments on land holdings
that they do not operate (lc − l > 0) or else rent in land over and above their holdings
(lc − l ≤ 0).
4.2. Communal land
The economy’s aggregate endowment of land is L. A fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of it is
communal, Lc = λL, while the rest is private, Lp = (1 − λ)L. All communal land
is held individually in the form of lc, requiring Lc =
∫
lc(x)dH(x). Within a time
period, an individual has exclusive user rights over lc, whether that be for the purpose
of operation or out-rental. The sale of communal land, on the other hand, is not
permitted. The key aspect of the model is the dynamic evolution of communal land
19In particular, we abstract from variable labor input. This is not a critical assumption given that the
majority of agricultural hours worked across the world, both in developed and developing countries, are
supplied by family members (Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2014). High monitoring costs are typically
advanced as the reason why farms rarely expand in labor.
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holdings through public interventions via expropriation and reallocation.
4.2.1. Expropriation
We assume that individual expropriation is governed by an exogenous institutional
policy with the following key ingredients features. Expropriation is defined as the loss
of all current-period communal land holdings, lc, at the start of the next time period.
Its occurrence is stochastic and endogenous since the expropriation probability depends
on an individual’s current-period actions. In particular, we model the “use it or lose
it” principle as follows. First, farmers face no expropriation risk tomorrow as long as
they operate at least the equivalent of their communal land holding, l ≥ lc.
20 Second,
whenever operations fall short of that level, l < lc, the probability of expropriation is
positive and increasing in the fraction of communal land that is rented out, (lc − l)/lc.
By renting out communal land, the individual runs the risk of losing it. The higher
the fraction of rented out land, the stronger is the signal that the household does
not require land for productive purposes. This enhances the motivation of the land
authority to seize the farmer’s holdings. The expropriation probability is highest in
the case of zero operations (l = 0), which coincides with the choice of employment in
the non-agricultural sector.21
Formally, the function that defines the expropriation probability πE reads as follows
πE(lc, l) =



τ
(
lc−l
lc
)µ
if lc − l > 0,
0 otherwise.
(1)
The parameter τ ∈ [0, 1] represents the highest possible expropriation probability,
which applies when l = 0. The parameter µ ≥ 0 governs the curvature of the function
20Agents are assumed to operate their own holding lc before renting in any additional land.
21We take a short-cut by assuming that non-operated land is invariably rented out. Strictly speaking,
the expropriation probability is thought to increase in non-operated land so that renting it out rather
than leaving it idle is always a dominant strategy. In Sub-Saharan Africa it is common practice for
migrating farmers to leave their land for free in the hands of extended family members. In the context
of our model, this is akin to expropriation as no rental payments are received.
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with regard to the fraction of rented out land. The expropriation probability is thus
decreasing and convex in l/lc, as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2. The parameter
µ spans various scenarios. When µ = 1 the expropriation probability is linear in the
fraction of rented-out land. On the opposite end of the spectrum, when µ → ∞ the
probability tends to zero as long as the individual’s operations are strictly positive,
l > 0. In that case, farmers are completely shielded from expropriation, and the risk
only applies to those leaving the agricultural sector.
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Figure 2: Illustration of expropriation and reallocation functions
4.2.2. Reallocation
Expropriated communal land is reallocated to farmers via a lump-sum transfer v.
A farmer can receive one such transfer per period where v is endogenous to ensure that
the total of reallocated land equals the amount of expropriated land. Also, reallocation
is stochastic, which is a suitable assumption: some individuals receive a better ex-post
treatment by the local authorities than others. Finally, the probability of receiving
a transfer in the upcoming period is endogenous in the individual’s current-period
action and state. First, we assume that only current-period farmers are entitled to
the transfer. Second, we assume that reallocation is progressive: the probability of
an additional communal land transfer depends negatively on the amount of current
communal land holdings lc.
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Formally, the function that defines the reallocation probability πR is defined as
πR(lc,1a) =



φ
[
1−
(
lc/v
1+lc/v
)ǫ]
if 1a = 1;
0 otherwise.
(2)
The parameter φ ∈ (0, 1] represents the highest possible probability of transfer receipt,
which applies to landless farmers (lc = 0). The degree of progressivity of the function,
meanwhile, is governed by ǫ > 0, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2. The lower
is ǫ, the lower is the likelihood of an additional transfer for any given strictly positive
level of lc > 0. At ǫ→ 0 only landless farmers can expect a transfer with probability φ
while farmers with lc > 0 receive no additional land. Conversely, as ǫ→ ∞ the transfer
probability equals φ for everyone and becomes independent of current holdings.22
4.3. Recursive formulation
The individual’s value function in recursive form is given by:
V (za, zn, lc) =max
1a,l
{
1a
(
pz1−γa l
γ − rl
)
+ (1− 1a)(1− θ)zn + rlc
+ β
(
[1− πE(lc, l)]πR(lc,1a)Ez′|zV (z
′
a, z
′
n, lc + v)
+ [1− πE(lc, l)][1− πR(lc,1a)]Ez′|zV (z
′
a, z
′
n, lc)
+ πE(lc, l)πR(lc,1a)Ez′|zV (z
′
a, z
′
n, v)
+ πE(lc, l)[1− πR(lc,1a)]Ez′|zV (z
′
a, z
′
n, 0)
)}
(3)
where Ez′|zV (z
′
a, z
′
n, l
′
c) = (1− ζ)V (za, zn, l
′
c) + ζ
∫
V (z′a, z
′
n, l
′
c)dΨ(z
′
a, z
′
n).
4.4. Consumption and market clearing
Consumption decisions occur at the level of the aggregate economy by means of a
stand-in household. The household has non-homothetic preferences over the consump-
22In the stationary equilibrium, the lump-sum transfer is identical across periods. Equilibrium hold-
ings of communal land can then be expressed on a discrete grid lc = nv, where n ∈ N is the individual’s
history of the number of accumulated transfers uninterrupted by expropriation.
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tion of agricultural (Ya) and non-agricultural goods (Yn),
U(Ya, Yn) = η log(Ya − a) + (1− η) log Yn
with η ∈ (0, 1) and the subsistence requirement a > 0. The stand-in household’s budget
is given by
pYa + Yn =
∫
b(x)dH(x) + rLp + θYn.
The household collects individual revenue b, income from renting out private land Lp at
the rate r as well as collects the tax non-agricultural output. The price of agricultural
goods is p while that of non-agricultural goods is normalized to unity. The resulting
optimality condition η/(Ya−a) = p(1−η)/Yn is the standard driving force of structural
transformation.23
The agricultural and non-agricultural goods market clear as follows:
Ya =
∫
ya(x)dH(x) (4)
and
Yn =
∫
[1− 1a(x)]zn(x)dH(x). (5)
The land market clears according to
∫
l(x)dH(x) = L. (6)
Finally, the amount of reallocated must be consistent with the amount that is expro-
priated so that
∫
lc(x)dH(x) = λL. (7)
23If the utility function applied directly to individuals, its curvature would imply a consumption-
smoothing motive for individuals facing variations in skills. We would like to abstract from such
concerns here, which is why individual utility is assumed to be linear. The trade-off between agricultural
and non-agricultural goods, on the other hand, is preserved by the use of the stand-in household. Our
framework, however, is not suited to analyze individual welfare.
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5. Characterization of the equilibrium
From now on we focus on stationary equilibria as defined in Appendix B. Note that
besides the stationary distribution H, there are three equilibrium objects: p, r and v.
5.1. Equilibrium without expropriation and reallocation
First, consider individual choices in absence of expropriation risk, τ = 0. In this
case, communal land is analogous to private land; since it is not expropriated, πE = 0,
it is also not reallocated, v = 0 and πR = 0. Observe from the value function (3)
that occupational and land operation choices, then, only maximize current income.24
Farmers equalize the marginal revenue of land operations to the rental rate,
l⋆(za; p, r) =
(γp
r
) 1
1−γ
za, (8)
which gives the following profit or implied agricultural wage income:
w⋆a(za; p, r) =
1− γ
γ
(γp
r
) 1
1−γ
rza. (9)
It is convenient to define two thresholds in the space of za. The first one, T
⋆, is
the threshold at which farming is an optimal choice (1a = 1), namely if and only if
w⋆a(za; p, r) ≥ (1− θ)zn. Using equation (9) this condition is
za ≥
γ(1− θ)
1− γ
(
r
γp
) 1
1−γ zn
r
≡ T ⋆(zn; p, r). (10)
The second threshold of interest, K⋆, is that at which farmers’ operations weakly
exceed their communal land holdings, l⋆(za; p, r) ≥ lc. Using equation (8) this condition
is
za ≥
(
r
γp
) 1
1−γ
lc ≡ K
⋆(lc; p, r). (11)
24In particular, the rental market in this case allocates land efficiently. The economy’s only source
of inefficiency is the standard occupational wedge, θ 6= 0.
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Thus, in the absence of land expropriation and reallocation, individuals become farm-
ers if and only if za ≥ T
⋆(zn; p, r). Moreover, conditional on farming, they operate
more than their holdings by renting in additional land if and only if za > K
⋆(lc; p, r).
Conversely, farmers strictly rent out some of their communal land holdings if and only
if za < K
⋆(lc; p, r).
5.2. Equilibrium with expropriation and reallocation
Consider now an economy that features expropriation risk, τ > 0, and therefore
also reallocation of communal land, v ≥ 0. Observe from the value function (3) that
individuals’ choices are now intertemporal as they affect expected future communal
land holdings. Our analysis distinguishes farmers based on whether their choices of
occupation and the size of operations is distorted by the communal land tenure system.
Proposition 1. There exists a threshold T (zn, lc; p, r, v) such that individuals with
agricultural skill za ≥ T (zn, lc; p, r, v) choose the agricultural occupation. Moreover, the
threshold is such that T (zn, lc; p, r, v) < T
⋆(zn; p, r).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Under communal land tenure system there exist farmers such that T (zn, lc; p, r, v) <
za ≤ T
⋆(zn; p, r) as defined in Proposition 1. We define these individuals as occupation-
ally constrained: they choose farming despite the fact that they can achieve a higher
current income by working in non-agriculture. As such, they are relatively unskilled
farmers because their comparative advantage lies in non-agriculture. Their choice to
work in farming is motivated by two factors. First, the risk of expropriation: the
higher is the agent’s communal holding, lc, the more he risks losing by choosing non-
agriculture. The second motivation is the promise of an additional land transfer v
tomorrow. The higher is the transfer probability πR, the more profitable is the agri-
cultural activity. In contrast, farmers of type za ≥ T
⋆(zn; p, r) are relatively skilled
because for them, agricultural employment dominates even in absence of communal
land considerations.
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Proposition 2. Farmers of type za ≥ K
⋆(lc; p, r) choose non-distorted land operations
l = l⋆(za; p, r). Conversely, farmers of type za < K
⋆(lc; p, r) choose land operations
such that l ∈ (l⋆(za; p, r), lc).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Farmers of type za ≥ K
⋆(lc; p, r) are relatively land-poor because the threshold K
⋆
in equation (11) is increasing in lc. Their choice of land operations does not affect their
continuation value: they do not fear expropriation as they do not rent out land, and
the probability of receiving land transfers is independent of operations l. Conversely,
farmers of type za < K
⋆(lc; p, r) are relatively land-rich as they rent out land. Doing
so, however, raises the specter of expropriation. To protect themselves against such
an outcome, they rent out strictly less land than dictated by marginal productivity
and hence operate inefficiently large farms. We define these farmers as operationally
constrained because their scale of operation is larger than that which maximizes current
income, l > l⋆(za; p, r).
za ≥ K⋆(lc; p, r) za < K⋆(lc; p, r)
Farmer type (A) Farmer type (B)
za ≥ T ⋆(zn; p, r) Occupation: unconstrained Occupation: unconstrained
Operation: unconstrained Operation: constrained
l = l⋆(za; p, r) ≥ lc l ∈ (l⋆(za; p, r), lc)
Farmer type (C) Farmer type (D)
T (zn, lc; p, r, v) ≤ za < T ⋆(zn; p, r) Occupation: constrained Occupation: constrained
Operation: unconstrained Operation: constrained
l = l⋆(za; p, r) ≥ lc l ∈ (l⋆(za; p, r), lc)
Table 1: Characterization of farmer types.
Table 1 summarizes the resulting four types of farmers, A-D. In particular, it clar-
ifies the impact of the communal land tenure system in a partial equilibrium setting.
At given prices p and r, the policy unambiguously bolsters the demand for land, both
by encouraging relatively skilled farmers to run relatively large operations (type B)
and by encouraging unskilled farmers to farm at all (types C and D). These channels,
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moreover, stimulate the supply of agricultural output, Ya, while dampening that of
non-agricultural goods, Yn. The general equilibrium impact, however, is more involved
because market clearing implies upward pressure on the rental rate, r, and downward
pressure on the price of agricultural output, p. Such price distortions create coun-
tervailing forces that lower the demand for land while discouraging (encouraging) the
supply of agricultural (non-agricultural) output. The relative strength of these forces
depends crucially on the stationary distribution H(x) that maps the relative mass of
skills za and zn to the amount of communal holdings lc.
6. Calibration
We calibrate the model to Ethiopia around the year 2012. As discussed in subsection
3.2, the land tenure system in Ethiopia lends itself well to mapping the model to data.
First, Ethiopia has explicit laws that are captured by our expropriation and reallocation
functions. Second, the tenure regime has remained stable for about three decades prior
to 2012, which implies a time frame that is sufficiently long to compare empirical
outcomes to a stationary distribution. Third, because land sales are forbidden, the
current land distribution can be rationalized as a result of the proposed policies. Fourth,
since all land is communal, we do not need to worry about any potential co-variation
between the distributions of communal and private land.
Before proceeding, we would like to clarify that the quantification is relevant for all
poor economies where the spirit of the “use it lose it” principle underlies land tenure.
While in Ethiopia the expropriation and reallocation of land are guided by explicit
policies, in many other Sub-Saharan African economies such rules are implicit under
customary tenure and enforced by local leaders or elders. “Expropriation” therefore
need not be a unilateral act by a central authority. It can just as well be understood as
a cultural norm by which individuals who are perceived to require less land (e.g. the
young who migrate to cities or the elderly farmers detaining large holdings) are obliged
to share it with others. The crucial element is that individuals cannot easily transfer
away land for economic gain.
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6.1. Set parameters
Since all land in Ethiopia is communal we set λ = 1. Based on the legal provisions
outlined in subsection 3.2, we posit that the entire land holding can be rented out
following migration, but that expropriation kicks in on average after two years. This
strikes a balance between the principle that non-farmers cannot rent out land at all,
and the fact that in practice land rentals are not immediately detected. We thus fix
the maximum expropriation probability τ to 0.5.
The land endowment L is normalized to unity. As the model is calibrated to annual
frequency, we fix the discount factor β to the standrad value 0.96. We also fix the prob-
ability of skill change ζ to 0.02. This implies that the entire set of individual-specific
skills changes on average once in 50 years, or roughly once in a generation. The land
intensity parameter γ is set to 0.33. In absence of frictions, this parameter is equiv-
alent to the agricultural land share. Historically, share-cropping arrangements have
assigned by rule-of-thumb a value of between 1/3 and 1/2 to landowners as reported
e.g. in Mundlak (2005). We settle for the more conservative lower bound in the light
of evidence that the land share in modern agriculture may be somewhat lower than
one-third.25
Following Lagakos and Waugh (2013), we assume that the skill distribution Ψ(za, zn)
is a Frank copula with interdependence parameter ρ of the individual Fréchet distri-
butions Ψa(za) = exp
(
z−ψaa
)
and Ψn(zn) = exp
(
z−ψnn
)
. Determining the interde-
pendence parameter ρ is beyond the scope of this paper and we set ρ = 3.5 as in
Lagakos and Waugh (2013), implying a correlation coefficient of 0.44 between log za
and log zn. The correlation is positive and hence in line with the intuition that skills
in the two activities are in part driven by a common component such as cognitive and
25For the U.S. Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) find that the income share accruing to land in
agricultural value-added is a fraction 0.18/(0.18+0.64) = 0.28 of the combined labor and land shares.
Such a relatively low land share results from the imputation of the indirect contribution of land from
non-agricultural intermediate inputs for which land is negligible. However, the nominal agricultural
intermediate input share in Sub-Saharan Africa is low relative to developed economies (Donovan, 2016),
suggesting that more weight should be attached to the direct contribution of land. Setting γ = 0.33
therefore appears to be a reasonable middle ground.
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Parameter Value Moment Target
Set parameters
Share of communal land (λ) 1.00 Share of communal land
Max. expropriation probability (τ) 0.50 Ethiopian law
Endowment of land (L) 1.00 Normalization
Discount factor (β) 0.96 Annual frequency
Probability to draw new skill set (ζ) 0.02 Frequency of talent draw
Span of control (γ) 0.33 Land share
Interdependence (ρ) 3.50 Lagakos & Waugh (2013)
Calibrated parameters
Talent distribution non-agriculture (ψn) 1.64 Variance of non-ag. wages (log) 0.831
Talent distribution agriculture (ψa) 1.61 Variance of land to labor ratio (log) 0.630
Occupational wedge (θ) 0.42 Value-added ratio ag. vs non-ag. 0.523
Subsistence requirement (ā) 0.98 Agricultural employment share 0.727
Relative preference for ag. goods (η) 0.28 GDP share of subsistence cons. 0.330
Curvature of expropriation function (µ) 3.19 Share of land rented in 0.195
Probability to obtain a land transfer (φ) 0.07 Fraction of landless farmers 0.069
Progressivity of land redistribution (ǫ) 9.16 Expropriation rate 0.006
Table 2: Calibration
physical ability. At the same time, the correlation is sufficiently moderate to reflect
that the two activities value different types of knowledge and experience profiles. In
particular the correlation coefficient is comprised between two values obtained from
calibrations that directly target moments on occupational switchers. Whereas Alvarez
(2018) infers a high positive correlation of 0.83 in Brazil using an identical distribution
to ours, Adamopoulos et al. (2017) find a negative correlation of -0.34 in China using
a multi-variate log-normal distribution. In Appendix D we show that the main results
are robust to an alternative calibration assuming independent draws, ρ = 0.
6.2. Jointly calibrated parameters
The parameters ψa ≥ 0 and ψn ≥ 0 determine the mean and the dispersion of skill in
both sectors. The empirical data moment chosen to discipline ψn is the variance of the
permanent component of (log) earnings in the non-agricultural sector. We compute this
to be 0.831 from the LSMS-ISA panel dataset for Ethiopia. The associated calibrated
value of ψn is 1.638. For agriculture, we set ψa so that our model matches the empirical
variance of the permanent component of the (log) ratio between operated land and labor
at the household level. In particular, we focus on a restricted sample of GPS measured
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pure-stand fields on which staple crops are planted for the two waves of the LSMS-ISA
survey. We estimate the permanent component of the agricultural land to labor ratio
by regressing our measure on household and time fixed effects. The empirical variance
is 0.63 and the associated calibrated value of ψa equals 1.614. Please see Appendix C
for further details.
The subsistence requirement a is calibrated to 0.98 in order to match a share of
aggregate income spent on subsistence consumption paapaYa+Yn of 0.33. This is an estimate
from Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) on a sample of Indian rural households in 1984.
We use it based on the fact that GDP per capita in India in 1984 is comparable to that of
Ethiopia in 2012.26 Ethiopia’s fraction of agricultural employment, Na = 0.727, is then
targeted by preference parameter η = 0.283. Our procedure results in a substantially
higher preference for agricultural goods than methods that target the long-run share
of agricultural employment shares in currently rich countries. As a robustness check
we propose an alternative calibration in Appendix D where η is set to 0.01. The main
results are largely unaffected.
Next, the wedge on non-agricultural labor income θ = 0.419 is strongly identi-
fied by matching the nominal value-added share of agriculture, paYapaYa+Yn . We compute
Ethiopia’s empirical equivalent in 2012 to be 0.522 based on World Bank data on the
sectoral nominal value-added shares, V Aa = 0.449 and V An = 0.551, adjusted for
physical capital income.27
This leaves us with three remaining policy parameters. The first moment is the
fraction of rented-in communal land, (
∫
max{lc(x) − l(x), 0}dx)/Lc. We compute this
to be 19.5% as a simple average between the 2011-2012 and 2013-2014 LSMS-ISA
rounds. The rental market in Ethiopia is active as reflected in the calibrated value of
the parameter µ that governs the curvature of the function that governs the individual
26Following World Bank data, GDP per capita in constant 2005 dollars (the only comparable data
series) amounts to 325 USD for India in 1984 and 272 USD for Ethiopia in 2012.
27In absence of precise data on aggregate data on sectoral income shares, we fix the non-agricultural
capital share to the standard 0.33 and that of agriculture to 0.1. It follows that pnYn = 0.67 × V An
and Ya = 0.9× V Aa.
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expropriation probabilities. At 3.191 the quantification suggests that while farmers
who rent out land are not shielded from expropriation (as µ << ∞), they do run a
considerably lower risk than migrants (as µ > 1). For instance, whereas the expropria-
tion probability is 50 percent (ΠE = τ) when all land holdings are rented out, it is only
about 5 percent when half of their holding are rented out. Another data moment that
we obtain from the LSMS-ISA is the fraction of landless farming households, which is
6.9% (computed as the fraction of farmers who rent in their entire land operations).
The parameter that exerts the strongest influence on that outcome is φ, the probability
faced by landless farmers of being allocated communal land, calibrated to 0.072. This
implies that a landless farming household needs to wait on average about 14 years to
be allocated a plot of communal land.
Parameter ǫ determines the progressivity of the function that governs the individ-
ual reallocation probabilities. It is tightly linked to other matched moments described
above, such as the variability of operations and the fraction of land rented in. At the
same time it also generates the allocation of communal holdings and therefore governs
the degree of potential mismatch between individual holdings and marginal productiv-
ities. As such it is indirectly related to the equilibrium expropriation rate, namely the
fraction of individuals that in a given period experience expropriation. Because there
are no recent comprehensive data on expropriation, we rely on our own small-scale
household questionnaire administered in several distinct locations in Ethiopia (please
see Appendix C for details). In particular, we inquired whether the household or the
parents of the household’s head have ever been subject to land expropriation. From
this we compute an expropriation rate of 0.55%. Put into perspective, this implies that
each year one in two hundred households experiences expropriation.28 The calibrated
28Admittedly, this figure is imprecisely estimated as our sample of 44 households is small. At the
same time, it is likely to be a conservative lower bound. Based on a nationally representative survey
of farm households, Deininger and Jin (2006) find that 9 percent of farmers were affected by land
redistribution in the period between 1991 and 1998. Also, the dataset used in Dercon and Krishnan
(2010) confirms that about 7 percent of household lost land during the redistribution between 1994
and 1999. These frequent expropriations, however, also include episodes of land redistributions in the
1990s that differ from the expropriation mechanism proposed in our model. For this reason we settle
on a relatively low rate of expropriation.
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value of the parameter ǫ is 9.157, which is high. It suggests that the probability of being
allocated communal land (conditional on farming) is almost independent of the size of
existing land holdings.29 This is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in
subsection 3.2 that suggests that the reallocation of land was motivated by political
rather than economic considerations.
6.3. Non-targeted moments
We evaluate the performance of our model by highlighting a number of important
non-targeted moments. First, the model generates a variance of (log) agricultural skills
za of 0.76 among individuals employed in agriculture. Chen et al. (2017) infer farm
TFP in Ethiopia and find a standard deviation of (log) farm TFP of 0.91, implying a
variance of 0.83. Our model outcome is therefore very close. Second, the model predicts
a variance of (log) communal land holdings, lc, of 0.48. In comparison, the empirical
measure is 0.61. While the model understates the dispersion of operations and holdings
relative to the data, the discrepancy is not large. In addition, we note that the model
matches the empirics qualitatively by producing a slightly lower dispersion in holdings
than in operations. Third, the correlation between land holdings and operations in
the model is 0.79. In the data that correlation amounts to 0.75 on average across
the two LSMS-ISA waves. This last moment gives us particular confidence that our
model captures well the frictions that produce a high correlation between holdings and
operations.
7. Results
We now present the main results: the quantitative impact of removing communal
land tenure on aggregate statistics. The key comparison of interest is between our
benchmark economy (λ = 1) and a counterfactual economy where communal land is
29For example, if the probability of passing from no land to a first transfer is φ, the probability of
passing from nine to ten transfers is 0.62× φ.
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fully transferable (λ = 0).30
7.1. Main results
Ya Yn Na (p.p.) p r/p
2.6 16.4 -18.1 8.5 -42.0
GDP Ya/Na Yn/Nn Real APG Nom. APG
9.3 37.2 -29.3 -48.5 -52.5
Table 3: Aggregate effects of communal land reform. The table documents the effects on the benchmark
economy of abandoning communal land (λ = 0). All numbers are percent changes except agricultural
employment, which gives the percentage point change.
Table 3 presents the main results of this paper. Removing the communal land
tenure system generates a slight increase in agricultural output, Ya, of 2.6%, and a large
increase in non-agricultural output, Yn, of 16.4%. We also find that land liberalization
is associated with a sizable drop in the share of farmers of 18.1 percentage points, from
72.0 to 53.9 percentage points (i.e., a 25% reduction in agricultural employment and
a 65% increase in non-agricultural employment). These movements are accompanied
by a 8.5% increase in the relative price of agricultural goods, p, and a steep decline of
42% in the relative rental rate of land, r/p.
Next, we turn to aggregate and sectoral productivity. Removing communal land
tenure increases GDP by 9.3%.31 This is quite large. Yet it also indicates that the mis-
allocation caused by communal land is unlikely to be the major cause of low aggregate
productivity in developing countries. Communal land tenure does, however, offer a key
explanation for the agricultural productivity puzzle in developing countries. Lifting
communal tenure generates a 37.2% increase in agricultural productivity, Ya/Na, and a
29.3% drop in non-agricultural productivity, Yn/Nn. Altogether, the real agricultural
productivity gap, Yn/NnYa/Na , plummets by 48.5% as a result of full land liberalization.
30Recall that an economy with no communal land, λ = 0, is equivalent to one with communal land
yet no threat of expropriation, τ = 0.
31GDP is evaluated in constant prices of the calibrated economy, Yn + pλ=1Ya. The resulting change
would be almost identical if, instead, we used the constant price of the non-distorted one (pλ=0).
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Given the movements in the real APG and the price p, the nominal APG, Yn/NnpYa/Na ,
drops even further, by 52.5%. Communal land tenure therefore accounts for about one
half of the real and nominal APG puzzle in an economy such as Ethiopia.
7.2. Decomposition of agricultural productivity gains
Agricultural productivity can be rewritten as follows:
Ya
Na
= q̄z̄1−γa
(
L
Na
)γ
(12)
where z̄a is the average agricultural skill of farmers and where the term q̄ ∈ (0, 1] cap-
tures operational misallocation. In absence of operational misallocation, q̄ = 1.32 The
real agricultural productivity gain from lifting communal land tenure can be decom-
posed as follows:
Y ′a/N
′
a
Ya/Na
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.372
=
1
q
︸︷︷︸
1.078
×
(
z̄′a
z̄a
)1−γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.157
×
(
Na
N ′a
)γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.100
The first term captures operational misallocation. For example, consider an an-
nounced reform that allowed communal land to be fully transferable yet imposed pro-
hibitive costs of switching sectors. Agricultural productivity would increase by 7.8%
as a result of optimizing the use of land while leaving the number and average skill of
farmers unchanged. A complete liberalization, on the other hand, also removes occupa-
tional misallocation. This raises agricultural productivity through two channels. One
is a 15.7% increase due to higher average quality of farmers. The other is a mechanical
10% increase resulting from a reduction in the number of farmers. This last effect is
simply a consequence of decreasing aggregate returns to scale in agriculture as land is
in fixed supply. This suggests that only about 20% (=7.8/37.2) of the impact of land
tenure on agricultural productivity is due to operational misallocation. The primary
channel of misallocation is occupational.
32Formally, q̄ =
∫
za(x)q(x)
1−γh(x)dx
[
∫
za(x)q(x)h(x)dx]
γ [za(x)h(x)dx]
1−γ where q(x) ≡
l(x)
l⋆(za)
≥ 1 denotes departures from
optimal land use. To find this, integrate over the land use l(x) = q(x)l⋆(za) = q(x)
(
γp
r
) 1
1−γ za to find
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Figure 3: Average size of operations conditional on agr. skills.
We would like to emphasize that while the aggregate impact of operational misallo-
cation may be rather small, its signature features are very much present in the bench-
mark economy. For this, consider Figure 3 that plots the average scale of operation of
farmers as a function of agricultural skill.33 In the non-distorted economy individual
farmer operations are log-linear in agricultural skills. In the distorted economy, that
is also approximately true for the very high skilled farmers since their own communal
holdings typically are lower than the desired scale of operations. For low-skilled agri-
cultural workers, on the other hand, the relationship between average land operations
and skills is flat. Because much of the mass of farmers is on the flat section, the correla-
tion between the agricultural skill of farmers, log za, and the size of operations, log l, is
relatively low, 0.47, instead of being perfect as in the economy without communal land.
Moreover, we note from Figure 3 that lifting communal land tenure leads to realloca-
tion of land towards higher skilled farmers. In particular, this increases the variance
of (log) operations from 0.63 to 0.79, in line with Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014)
the land clearing price r/p, and then replace that expression after integrating over y(x) = z1−γa l(x)
γ .
33That is, for each za, the expected value
∫ ∫
l(x)I(x)h(x)dzndlc∫ ∫
I(x)h(x)dzndlc
.
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who hypothesize that distortionary policies may be responsible for the low dispersion
in farm size in developing countries.
Restuccia and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2017), for Malawi, and Chen et al. (2017), for
Ethiopia, compute that the scale of operations is by and large uncorrelated with inferred
farm productivity. The flat section of the graph is therefore consistent with their
findings. The increasing section, however, is not. This is because in our framework
high-skilled farmers rent in land optimally at the prevailing rental rate. It also drives
our conclusion that operational misallocation resulting from the communal land policy
is relatively weak. Note that this does not imply that the operational misallocation in
general is low. It simply means that it is likely not a consequence of communal land
tenure systems that usually do not set an upper limit on the size of farms. Our interest
here is restricted to the impact of a particular and widespread policy, while in the data,
land may otherwise be misallocated for a variety of reasons such as financial frictions,
distorted input markets or agency frictions between landlord and tenants. In addition,
measuring the true extent of operational misallocation across farms is challenging.
Gollin and Udry (2017) find that standard procedures imply large misallocation across
plots operated by the same farmer, which is likely to indicate measurement error.
Correcting for it yields gains from optimal factor reallocation across farmers that are
substantially smaller.
7.3. Communal land liberalization and occupational switch
The overall GDP gain from lifting communal land tenure is moderate because the
two sectoral productivities move in opposite directions. The sectoral composition of
the workforce is key to understand this result: it is the only driver of the drop in
non-agricultural productivity and, as argued above, the main cause of the agricultural
productivity increase. To see how the two are interconnected, we turn to Table 4.
The upper half summarizes the shares and average characteristics of different types
of workers in the benchmark economy broken down by occupation and, conditional
on farming, whether they are constrained in the choice of occupational and/or size of
operations (corresponding to Table 1). The lower half quantifies the shares and average
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characteristics of the subset of workers who choose to switch occupation following an
unannounced reform that permanently secures property rights by suspending the threat
of expropriation (i.e., by setting τ = 0).34
Occupation, T Farmers Non-farmers
Occ. constraint, T ⋆ No No Yes Yes
Oper. constraint, K⋆ No Yes No Yes
Farmer type (A) (B) (C) (D) (A)+(B)+(C)+(D)
Mass, initial 12.2 20.9 4.4 34.5 72.0 28.0
Average za 9.4 2.5 1.5 1.2 3.0 1.7
Average zn 2.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 5.5
Average lc 0.6 1.7 0.1 1.6 1.4 0.0
Mass, switch 0.0 0.0 0.7 18.6 19.3 1.2
Average za - - 0.8 1.1 1.0 4.1
Average zn - - 0.9 1.6 1.5 4.0
Average lc - - 0.1 1.8 1.7 0.0
Table 4: Shares of individuals by types.
We compute that in the benchmark economy, only 17% of farmers (12.2 percentage
points out of 72 percentage points of farmers) are unconstrained by the land policy.
The largest group of farmers is constrained on both margins. Relative to the average
farmer, the model suggests that they are relatively unskilled in the agricultural activity,
za/zn, yet detain relatively large communal land holdings. Note also that only 6%
of farmers (4.4 out of 72 percentage point) are occupationally but not operationally
constrained. These farmers have little communal land and remain in agriculture solely
because they anticipate the receipt of land grants in the future. This suggests that
the tenure system’s pull effect into agriculture works mainly through the channel of
threatening the expropriation of current holdings (“locking in farmers”) as opposed to
the promise of future transfers.
Limited land transferability is often viewed as a means to prevent massive (and
potentially disruptive) migration flows from rural to urban areas. Assuming that the
perception of this pent-up migration pressure is based on current equilibrium prices p
34Note that upon such a reform, the model economy would immediately jump to the new equilibrium.
There is no transition period as expropriation and redistribution stop at once.
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and r, the model rationalizes why a land reform that secures transfer rights is perceived
as causing massive occupational switching. At current prices, more than half (54%)
are occupationally constrained and would therefore switch sectors if the land tenure
system were removed. Our computations, however, suggest that the resulting relative
price changes would undo much of that migration pressure as terms of trade shift
in the favor of farmers: the price of agricultural output increases while the cost of
renting land drops. We find that in general equilibrium only about half of those would-
be movers actually make the switch, 19.3 percentage points. Observe as well that
the equilibrium price changes motivate about 1.2 percentage points of non-farmers to
switch into agriculture.
Most importantly, consider the average characteristics of farmers switching sectors
relative to staying farmers. The reason that they switch into non-agriculture is not
because their non-agricultural skills, zn, are significantly higher (1.5 relative to 1.4).
They switch because their agricultural skills, za, are low (1.0 relative to 3.0) and be-
cause they detain higher communal land holdings that kept them in agriculture in the
first place (1.7 relative to 1.3). As a result, when they arrive in the non-agricultural
sector they pull down the productivity of that sector because they have significantly
lower non-agricultural skills, zn, relative to the incumbents (1.5 relative to 5.5). This
is instructive. In a nutshell, the communal land tenure system, by threatening to ex-
propriate holdings that have been accumulated over the past, acts as a device to keep a
large mass of individuals in agriculture who have low agricultural and non-agricultural
skills. Removing the system generates a large occupational shift that – through com-
position – increases agricultural productivity and lowers that of non-agriculture.
7.4. Coexistence of communal and private land
Finally, we re-compute the main aggregate statistics for economies with various
aggregate shares of communal land, λ, i.e. economies where communal land coexists
with private land. This is of interest because Ethiopia can be viewed as representative
of many developing countries both in terms of its fundamentals – the intrinsic produc-
tivity distribution za and zn – as well as in terms of principles governing communal
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land tenure. At the same time, other African economies have dual land markets where
some land is strictly communal and following traditional customary tenure transferabil-
ity principles, while the rest is under complete owernship and fully transferable. This
can loosely be represented by various values of λ. Similarly, in Appendix E we con-
sider departures from the benchmark economy with respect to other policy parameters
governing the expropriation and reallocation function.
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Figure 4: Effects of communal land reform on economic aggregates. The figure documents station-
ary equilibria for various economies indexed by λ. All variables except agricultural employment are
normalized to the calibrated economy (λ = 1).
The results are depicted in Figures 4 and 5. Most variables are monotonic and
quite linear in λ. Notable exceptions are agricultural output, Ya, and the price of agri-
cultural output, p. This can be understood in conjunction with Figure 6 that depicts
the components of agricultural productivity in equation (12). Introducing a little bit
of private land in an economy where most land is communal (i.e, lowering λ when λ is
close to 1) has a disproportional impact on the reduction of operational misallocation.
In this region of λ, occupational misallocation is reduced more slowly. It follows that
as agricultural productivity increases while farmers remain put in agriculture, agricul-
tural output grows faster than that of non-agriculture, and the market clearing price p
declines. In contrast, in economies with a substantial fraction of private land (say, at λ
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Figure 5: Effects of communal land reform on economic aggregates. The figure documents station-
ary equilibria for various economies indexed by λ. All variables except agricultural employment are
normalized to the calibrated economy (λ = 1).
close 0.5), a further reduction of communal land produces few productivity gains asso-
ciated with the reduction in operational misallocation. Instead, a marginal decline in
λ will now substantially reduce the attractiveness of the agricultural sector and hence
lower occupational misallocation. This means that agricultural output rises by little,
and may even fall, while non-agricultural output continues to rise. As a result, price p
increases.
8. Conclusion
This paper measures the general equilibrium impact of communal land tenure on
productivity and employment. For this we formalize stylized policies that capture
key elements of land tenure systems observed across many developing countries. We
emphasize the role of limited transferability of land by which individuals are only
exposed to the risk of expropriation when they rent out land. By doing that we heed
the lessons from the micro development literature which states that de jure tenure
insecurity (e.g. in the form of no formal land registration) does not necessarily imply de
facto tenure insecurity, as exemplified in the debate on tenure security and investment
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Figure 6: Decomposition of agricultural productivity gains.
(Fenske, 2011). We do, however, take a strong position on the fact that the threat of
expropriation has bite when farmers decide to turn user rights into commercial value
by renting out land, in particular when they stop farming altogether.
Our principal findings are as follows. Restoring land transferability in an economy
where all land is communal results in a GDP increase of 9% and a substantial decrease
in agricultural employment of 18 percentage points. The combined effect of a rise
in agricultural and fall in non-agricultural productivity generates a drop in the real
agricultural productivity gap by a factor of two. These quantifications result from
a calibration on Ethiopia. We argue that our results can be applied to other poor
agricultural economies with similar tenure regimes, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa.
We also recognize that in most of these economies, contrary to Ethiopia, private land
co-exists with communal land tenure. Our results therefore have to be viewed as closer
to the upper bound of the potential impact of communal land on the static misallocation
of land across users and individuals across occupations.
Our exercise offers the following lessons. First, communal land helps explaining the
agricultural productivity gap in the poorest countries. To the extent that selection plays
a key role, our results echo the findings of Lagakos and Waugh (2013), though in our
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case the occupational selection pattern is distorted. We emphasize that the primary
impact of communal land tenure is to keep disproportionately unskilled workers in
agriculture. Second, the removal of obstacles to land transferability results in aggregate
benefits, but it falls short of producing a first-order impact on aggregate productivity.
This implies that lowering the real and nominal APG in developing countries does
not by itself entail the solution to the development puzzle. To be sure, an extension
of our framework to include endogenous investment and other refinements may still
produce larger losses associated with communal land. Our framework, however, also
rules out by assumption any potential benefits of communal land. Since institutions
that limit land transferability are prevalent around the world, they certainly exist to
correct some undesirable outcomes. They may, for example, address issues such as
inequality, myopic behavior or incomplete insurance, in particular in economies with
few other public policy instruments. Our results are therefore silent on the ultimate
welfare consequences of communal land tenure. We leave it to future research to weigh
its distortionary effects against any potential benefits.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Cross-country data
In this subsection we outline our measures of the agricultural productivity gap
across countries. We also show that these measures relate to a particular index on
tenure insecurity.
Agricultural productivity gaps across countries
To construct a measure of the nominal agricultural productivity gap (APG) we
use 2005 World Bank data on the ratio of the non-agricultural value-added share,
pnYn/(paYa+pnYn), to the agricultural share, paYa/(paYa+pnYn), measured in current
USD, and adjusted by levels of employment Nj in each sector j = {a, n}. The nominal
agricultural productivity gap (APG) of country i is hence APGinom =
(pinY
i
n)/N
i
n
(piaY
i
a )/N
i
a
. The
nominal APG is then normalized to the U.S. to obtain its relative difference (RAPG),
i.e. RAPGinom = APG
i
nom/APG
US
nom.
The computation of the real APG is less straightforward. It again involves the use
of 2005 World Bank data as well as data from the Food and Agricultural Organisation
(FAO) for the years 2004-2005. We start from the identity:
pWBa Y
i
a + p
WB
n Y
i
n = p
WBY i. (A.1)
This decomposes country i’s real GDP measured in World Bank international dol-
lars pWBY i into real sectoral components of value-added evaluated at each sector’s
respective international price. Since neither pWBa Y
i
a nor p
WB
n Y
i
n are available we pro-
ceed with FAO data and make two critical assumptions. The FAO collects country-
specific industry-level prices for agricultural output in order to measure gross output
(O) in international FAO dollars, pFAO,Oa Oia. These are hence cross-country data on
real agricultural output, but not real valued-added, since for years other than 1985
the FAO does not collect prices for (non-agricultural) intermediate inputs used in agri-
culture. In order to obtain real value-added in agriculture we make the assumption
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that pFAO,Oa /p
i,O
a = pFAOa /p
i
a, i.e. the ratio between international and local industry
prices equals the ratio between international and local value-added deflators. This
gives pFAOa Y
i
a =
pFAO,Oa O
i
a
pi,Oa Oia
piaY
i
a . World Bank data on agricultural value-added in cur-
rent USD, piaY
i
a , coupled with FAO data on gross agricultural output in international
and current USD, respectively, pFAO,Oa Oia and p
i,O
a Oia, thus translate into the real
measure of value-added in agriculture, pFAOa Y
i
a . The second assumption is to trans-
late those into World Bank international prices by a factor of proportionality so that
pWBa Y
US
a = αp
FAO
a Y
i
a . We proceed as in Caselli (2005) by noting that given the size of
the U.S. in the construction of international prices one can assume pWBa Y
US
a = p
US
a Y
US
a .
From that we have that α = p
US,O
a O
US
a
pFAO,Oa OUSa
. With pWBa Y
i
a in hand we can hence compute
pWBn Y
i
n from (A.1). Finally, the real agricultural gap is hence APG
i
real =
(pWBn Y
i
n)/N
i
n
(pWBa Y
i
a)/N
i
a
.
Decile N Real APG N Nominal APG
1 11 22.92 13 6.02
2 11 20.02 13 4.66
3 11 17.16 13 3.52
4 11 11.45 13 2.39
5 11 10.17 13 2.54
6 11 5.37 13 2.08
7 11 4.39 13 2.76
8 11 3.57 13 2.85
9 11 3.15 13 1.64
10 11 2.90 13 1.70
Total 110 10.11 130 2.92
Table A1: Real and nominal relative APG (U.S.=1)
Table A1 ranks both measurements of APG (normalized to the U.S.) in deciles
according to real GDP per capita (in PPP) and reports the average APG for each
group.35 Clearly, the APG is decreasing in GDP per capita, and comparing the first
and last deciles gives factor differences of 22.92/2.90 = 7.9 and 6.02/1.70 = 3.5 for the
real and nominal measures, respectively.
35We drop countries smaller than 1,000 square kilometers in size. We also drop Burundi, Guyana,
Libya, Guyana which are clear outliers in terms of relative nominal agricultural productivity. This
does not significantly affect the results.
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Agricultural productivity gaps and tenure insecurity
The Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) of the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations (CEPII), provides an index on land tenure insecurity that covers a large
number of countries. The indicator ranges between 0 and 4 and is increasing in tenure
insecurity. It is constructed on the basis of answers to four aspects of tenure security,
namely (1) the importance of land expropriation practices, (2) the importance of land
issues in local politics/media, (3) the share of the urban population with tenure rights
that are not formally recognized, and (4) the share of the rural population with tenure
rights that are not formally recognized. In table A2 we regress our measures of nomi-
nal and real APG differences on the IPD indicator. The results suggest a statistically
significant relationship whereby high levels of tenure insecurity are systematically pos-
itively related to both the real and nominal APG. For comparison we also regress the
APG measures on GDP per capita.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nom. APG (log) Real APG (log) Nom. APG (log) Real APG (log)
GDP per capita (log) -0.278∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗
(-5.90) (-10.07)
Land tenure insecurity 0.226∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
(3.89) (6.97)
Constant 3.171∗∗∗ 7.027∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗
(7.69) (13.37) (3.19) (5.30)
Observations 130 110 119 102
t statistics in parentheses
Source: CEPII database, WorldBank and FAO (2005). GDP and APG’s are in logs.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A2: Real and nominal agricultural productivity gap (APG) and tenure insecurity.
Appendix B. Theory
We present the definition of the stationary equilibrium as well as all the proofs.
Definition of the stationary equilibrium
For an equilibrium to exist the economy must be sufficiently productive to ensure
that the subsistence requirement in agricultural goods is met, Ya > a. The stationary
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equilibrium is defined as the set of individual allocations b(x), 1a(x), l(x), ya(x), wa(x),
∀x; policy outcomes πE(x), πR(x), and l
′
c(x), ∀x; prices p and r; aggregate allocations
Ya and Yn; the transfer value v; as well as a stationary distribution H(x), such that:
1. all agents of type x solve their maximization problem (3);
2. the aggregate stand-in household solves its maximization problem;
3. goods and land markets clear according to equations (4), (5), (6) and (7);
4. the stationary distribution H(x) is consistent:
The stationary equilibrium always features positive expropriation and reallocation
because skills change through time. A changing skill set implies that at any point there
always exists a positive mass of farmers who are sufficiently unskilled so as to rent
out land, resulting in positive expropriation. The distribution of communal holdings
therefore cannot be static, meaning that it is less likely to depend on initial conditions.
Indeed, our numerical simulations around the calibrated economy suggest that distinct
initial conditions all lead to the same stationary distribution. We do not, however,
provide an analytic prove of its uniqueness.
Proof of Proposition 1
Comparing the value function (3) under the two sectoral choices we have that 1a = 1
if and only if
wa(za, l; p, r) +M(l) ≥ (1− θ)zn
where
M(l) ≡ β
{
[τ − πE(lc, l)]
(
Ez′|z
[
V (z′a, z
′
n, lc)− V (z
′
a, z
′
n, 0)
])
+ πR(lc, 1)[1 − πE(lc, l)]
(
Ez′|z
[
V (z′a, z
′
n, lc + v)− V (z
′
a, z
′
n, lc)
])
+ πR(lc, 1)πE(lc, l)
(
Ez′|z
[
V (z′a, z
′
n, v)− V (z
′
a, z
′
n, 0)
])}
.
The continuation difference term under any strictly positive choice of land operations
l > 0 is strictly positive, M(l) > 0. Let za = T denote the threshold value for which
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the individual is indifferent between the two activities:
wa(T , l; p, r) +M(l) = (1− θ)zn.
The indifferent farmer can be of two types, as shown in Proposition 2. Either his land
choice is non-distorted, i.e. l = l⋆, resulting in wa(T , l; p, r) = w
⋆
a(T ; p, r). In that case
we have
w⋆a(T ; p, r) +M(l
⋆) = (1− θ)zn. (B.1)
Alternatively, the indifferent farmer’s land choice is distorted, i.e. l > l⋆. If the
indifferent farmer, instead, chose non-distorted land operations l = l⋆, agriculture
would no longer be the optimal sector:
w⋆a(T ; p, r) +M(l
⋆) < (1− θ)zn. (B.2)
Combining equations (9) and (10) results in w⋆a(T ; p, r) =
T
T ⋆ (1− θ)zn. Combining this
with (B.1) and (B.2) yields
T
T ⋆
(1− θ)zn +M(l
⋆) ≤ (1− θ)zn.
Since M(l⋆) > 0, it follows that T < T ⋆. Finally, notice that the threshold value of T ,
through M(l), depends on the individual’s continuation which is a function of zn, lc
and v, in addition to p and r: T = T (zn, lc; p, r, v).
Proof of Proposition 2
Conditional on farming (1a = 1) the first-order condition with respect to l from the
value function (3) implies
γpz1−γa l
γ−1 = r +Q(l)
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where
Q(l) ≡
∂πE(lc, l)
∂l
β
(
πR(lc,1a)Ez′|z
[
V (z′a, z
′
n, lc + v)− V (z
′
a, z
′
n, v)
]
+ [1− πR(lc,1a)]Ez′|z
[
V (z′a, z
′
n, lc)− V (z
′
a, z
′
n, 0)
] )
.
Since V is strictly increasing in lc, Q(l) = 0 if and only if
∂πE(lc,l)
∂l = 0 (which is the
case when l ≥ lc). Otherwise it must be that Q(l) > 0 when
∂πE(lc,l)
∂l > 0 (which is the
case when l < lc). Two cases are thus possible. First, if l ≥ lc we have Q(l) = 0 and the
first-order condition results in l = l⋆. From the definition of K⋆ from (11) this implies
that za ≥ K
⋆. On the contrary, if l < lc, the first-order condition states that l > l
⋆.
This implies that lc > l
⋆. After replacing the expression of l⋆ we have that za < K
⋆.
Appendix C. Empirical moments
In this subsection we explain the construction of the moments of the targets used
for the calibration in section 6
LSMS-ISA Ethiopia
Most of our empirical moments are computed using the Ethiopian LSMS-ISA panel
dataset over the waves 2011-2012 and 2013-2014. We rely on the panel dimension to
back out permanent components in order to weed out transitory shocks (in income,
farm output) and measurement errors.
Our first moment is the dispersion in non-agricultural wages, wn. First, we construct
a panel of individuals and measure hourly wages for the two waves. We run an OLS
regression of (log) wages on a set of individual and time dummies, and then compute
the variance of the individual dummies to be 0.831.
The second moment is the dispersion in land operations l. The unit of our model is
an individual while its empirical part is a family farm. This is why we target the ratio
of land operations relative to farm labor.36 We construct a panel where land operations
36In particular, we posit that the empirical production function is y = (zn)1−γ l̃γ = z1−γ lγn where l̃
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include all the land used, namely the sum of fields on which staple crops are planted.
As for labor, we count the number of individuals (household labor, hired labor and free
labor) involved in planting and harvesting activities on staple crop fields, and aggregate
this measure up to the household level. The resulting ratio is regressed via OLS on a
set of individual and time dummies. The variance of the individual dummies, 0.630,
represents our target.
Beyond the moments that are used for the purpose of the calibration, we also com-
pute two empirical moments that will allow us to gauge the performance of our model.
The first non-targeted moment is the dispersion of land ownership, lc. To measure land
ownership at the household level we focus on a sample of field level measurements for
cultivated fields (pure stand and mixed crop). In particular, a household’s land owner-
ship comprises two parts. First, its operated parcels that are granted by local leaders
and inherited to be owned (excluding parcels that are rented/borrowed for free/moved
in without permission, which are considered to be rented in). Second, owned parcels
that are rented out. These are directly given in wave 2, while for wave 1 we only have
information on how many fields on a particular parcel have been rented out. To infer
the size of the land rented out, we assume that the fields within a parcel (on which there
is rental-out activity) are of equal size. We then aggregate the parcel level variables
at the holder level, before aggregating them to the household level. Finally, we divide
by total labor supply as computed above. The resulting ratio is regressed via OLS on
a set of individual and time dummies. The variance of the individual dummies, 0.61,
represents the dispersion in the permanent component of lc.
The second non-targeted moment is the correlation between (log) operations per
labor supply and (log) ownership per labor supply. It amounts to 0.66 and 0.85,
respectively, in the two waves, so 0.75 on average.
is total operations, n is total hours worked, and l is the ratio of the two.
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Own data collection
In December 2014, we interviewed randomly selected households in seven villages
(kebele) across four sub-regions (woreda) in Ethiopia’s two main regions (Amhara and
Oromia). In combination, the chosen locations in South Wollo and Arsi are as close to
representativeness of Ethiopian agriculture as one can get in a small sample. In each
village, we interviewed six or seven households to obtain a sample of 44 households. In
each village, we complemented a formal survey with a large number of semi-structured
focus group discussions and key informant interviews (village leaders, land committee
members and extension workers).
Mean Sample Size
Expropriation 0.068 44
Expropriation parents 0.36 44
Age household head 48.5 44
Age children 21.8 28
Source: Own dataset.
Table A3: Expropriation statistics
A section of the questionnaire is devoted to land expropriation and redistribution.
As part of our section on land expropriation and redistribution, household heads were
asked whether one of their household members has been subject to land expropriation
since household formation - see Table A3. Responses suggest that 6.8% have experi-
enced expropriation in Ethiopia. We consider this number to be rather low in light of
the numerous episodes of land expropriation and redistribution that have taken place
in Ethiopia over the last four decades. This is confirmed by further evidence from our
dataset, which documents that 36% of the parents of the household head (or spouse)
experienced expropriation.
Since we calibrate the model to annual frequency we adjust these expropriation
rates to annualized values and divide the expropriation rate by the average number of
years since household formation, which gives us a lower bound of 0.25%. Doing the
same adjustment with the expropriation rate on the parents of the household head, and
adjusting it by the average generational length of 43 years (totalling to a life expectancy
of 63 years in Ethiopia) gives us an upper bound of 0.85% for the expropriation rate.
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We take the mean of the upper and lower bounds and hence target a mean rate of
0.55%.
Appendix D. Robustness
Here, we study the robustness of our main results relative to two alternative cali-
brations. The first alternative calibration (“Calibration 1”) is one where we change the
interdependence parameter between agricultural and non-agricultural skills, ρ. In the
benchmark, ρ equals 3.5 following Lagakos and Waugh (2013), implying a moderately
positively correlation of skills. Given that this parameter is weakly identified, we con-
sider the case ρ = 0 so that two skills are independent draws. In the second alternative
calibration (“Calibration 2”) we consider lowering the preference parameter η = 0.28 to
η = 0.01, which is more standard in the literature. For this we ignore the data moment
on the share of subsistence consumption. As reported in Table A4, the first alternative
requires a re-calibration of all parameters, while the second alternative only requires a
re-adjustment of the subsistence parameter, a. Figures A1 and A2 portray the impact
of lowering the share of communal land, λ, on the main variables of interest.
Parameter Main calibration Calibration 1 Calibration 2
Set parameters
Share of communal land (λ) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Max. expropriation hazard (τ) 0.50 0.50 0.50
Endowment of land (L) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Discount factor (β) 0.96 0.96 0.96
Probability to draw new skill set (ζ) 0.02 0.02 0.02
Span of control (γ) 0.33 0.33 0.33
Interdependence (ρ) 3.50 0.00 3.50
Calibrated parameters
Talent distribution non-agriculture (ψn) 1.64 1.49 1.64
Talent distribution agriculture (ψa) 1.61 1.64 1.61
Generic tax (θ) 0.42 0.37 0.42
Subsistence requirement (ā) 0.98 0.99 1.53
Relative preference for ag. goods (η) 0.28 0.29 0.01
Curvature of expropriation function (µ) 3.19 3.26 3.19
Probability to obtain a land transfer (φ) 0.07 0.07 0.07
Progressivity of land redistribution (ǫ) 9.16 16.49 9.16
Table A4: Robustness of calibration.
We see that Calibration 1 yields very similar results to the benchmark calibration.
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The only difference relative to the benchmark calibration is that communal land has
somewhat smaller effects on most variables of interest. This is because occupational
misallocation is somewhat less pronounced as individual choices are more strongly
driven by comparative advantage. When skill draws are independent, there are fewer
individuals with low skills in both sectors who are inefficiently kept in agriculture by
communal land.
Calibration 2 also yields qualitatively similar results, while the quantitative impact
of communal land tenure now is a bit stronger than in the benchmark calibration. Agri-
cultural consumption here is mostly driven by the subsistence need so that agricultural
output hardly changes over the institutional parameter space. As a consequence, the
attractiveness of agricultural employment falls faster as λ decreases. Overall, our main
results are largely unchallenged. If anything, the described effects are larger when he
elasticity of food demand to income is low.
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Figure A1: Real aggregates. All variables except agricultural employment are normalized to the
calibrated economy (λ = 1).
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Figure A2: Productivity and prices. All variables are normalized to the calibrated economy (λ = 1).
Appendix E. Changes in policy parameters
In this section, we study the equilibrium impact of the four communal land tenure
policy parameters. This exercise is useful because it provides insight into the role that
the various policy parameters play in shaping the equilibrium. Also it illustrates the
impact of the communal regime in economies that are similar to Ethiopia yet differ along
one of the policy dimensions. We consider the sensitivity of key moments with respect
to (i) the maximum expropriation hazard, τ ; (ii) the curvature of the expropriation
function, µ; (iii) the probability of obtaining communal land transfer, φ; and (iv) the
progressivity of the land redistribution function, ǫ. We change each parameter and
then re-compute equilibrium change relative to the benchmark economy, as reported in
Table A5. For comparison we also report again the change associated with removing
communal land tenure, λ = 0.
Maximum expropriation probability, τ . Lowering the maximum expropriation
probability, τ , generates qualitatively similar outcomes as removing land tenure. Note,
however, that even at a low value of τ = 0.1 relative to the benchmark where τ = 0.5,
communal land tenure exercises a strong impact on sectoral and aggregate productivity
as well as employment. Conversely, increasing τ to 1, implying that non-agricultural
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Ya Yn Na (p.p.) p r/p
No comm. land, λ = 0 2.6 16.4 -18.1 8.5 -42.0
Low τ = 0.1 3.0 4.0 -1.8 -3.8 -21.4
High τ = 1 -1.4 -1.2 0.8 2.4 11.7
Low µ = 1 -11.0 -5.0 4.8 35.9 344.3
High µ = ∞ 6.3 3.0 -3.5 -12.0 -39.8
Low φ = 0.01 -3.9 1.6 -3.4 13.5 9.4
High φ = 1 2.5 -0.8 3.1 -7.3 -5.6
Low ǫ = 0.01 4.7 -1.8 5.6 -13.4 -11.4
Med ǫ = 1 1.3 -0.6 2.1 -4.1 -2.8
GDP Ya/Na Yn/Nn Real APG Nom. APG
No comm. land, λ = 0 9.3 37.2 -29.3 -48.5 -52.5
Low τ = 0.1 3.5 5.7 -2.3 -7.5 -3.9
High τ = 1 -1.3 -2.4 1.5 4.0 1.5
Low µ = 1 -8.1 -16.5 14.5 37.1 0.9
High µ = ∞ 4.7 11.7 -8.5 -18.1 -6.9
Low φ = 0.01 -1.3 0.9 -9.5 -10.3 -21.0
High φ = 1 0.9 -1.8 11.5 13.5 22.5
Low ǫ = 0.01 1.6 -2.9 23.0 26.7 46.3
Med ǫ = 1 0.4 -1.5 7.4 9.0 13.7
Table A5: Sensitivity to changes in policy parameters.
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workers face certain expropriation, has a weak additional quantitative impact. This
gives us confidence that the exact value of τ is not critical in understanding the main
effects. What matters is that there is some risk of expropriation: even a modest
maximum expropriation threat of 10 percent results in a sizeable impact.
Convexity of expropriation function, µ. We consider departures from the cal-
ibrated value of µ = 3.19, namely to the polar cases µ = 1 and µ → ∞. A decrease
in µ raises the expropriation probability, playing out similarly to an increase in τ . At
µ = 1 the expropriation probability becomes linear in the fraction of rented out land.
Accordingly, farmers become more reluctant to rent out their holdings, almost no land
is rented out, and the rental rate shoots up relative to the benchmark economy. The
additional misallocation of farmers’ scale of operation leads to a drop in agricultural
output, inducing a large increase in its price p. The number of farmers increases some-
what and GDP drops by 7.5 percent relative to the benchmark economy. Essentially,
µ = 1 describes an economy where land rentals are almost completely shut down. The
resulting efficiency losses associated with communal land, in particular the operational
misallocation, are therefore substantially more pronounced. In contrast, when µ→ ∞,
individuals can rent out land without any expropriation risk as long as they remain
farmers. Operations, therefore, are not distorted. There is still occupational misalloca-
tion, however, implying that the GDP gain is smaller than under the complete removal
of communal land tenure.
Maximum transfer probability, φ. We discuss variations in the maximum
transfer probability rate φ from the initial value of 0.07: a low value 0.01 followed
by the highest possible φ = 1. A decrease in φ implies that individuals face a lower
probability of receiving a land transfer. The agricultural occupation becomes less
attractive, generating fewer farmers, and therefore also an increase in the relative price
p. As a result, more of the skilled non-agricultural workers are drawn into farming,
implying a drop in non-agricultural productivity. GDP, however, is hardly affected by
that change.
Progressivity of transfer function ǫ. The last parameter sensitivity is with
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respect to ǫ, which governs the progressivity of the communal land reallocation. The
calibrated parameter ǫ = 9.16 is high and implies that communal land is slightly
progressive. We perform two variations: a medium value of ǫ = 1, and the lowest
possible value of ǫ→ 0. A decrease in ǫ plays out similarly to an increase in φ. In both
cases the dispersion in communal holdings declines. This means two things. On the one
hand there are many marginal individuals that prefer the agricultural sector, resulting
in a more agricultural employment and a drop in its price, p. In terms of GDP, the
least pernicious regime is that where reallocation is highly progressive. Interestingly,
it is also the regime that creates the largest APG, both real and nominal.
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